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Promissories and Pharmaceutical Patents:  
Agencing Markets through Public Narratives 
Abstract 
We investigate a body of data emanating from the 2008/9 EU 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, interpreting the collection of submissions 
to it as a concerted attempt at market innovation that becomes fraught 
with challenge and contest. In the pharmaceutical market, interests 
associated with patient concerns, government budgets, global "Big 
Pharma", and local "small pharma" coalesce and compete with patent 
law, technological innovation and drug lifecycles.  Our research question 
is: What role do market narratives play in shaping the market’s 
sociotechnical agencements? By introducing market narratives, we focus 
on the performative effects of temporality and iteration. Our argument is 
that by acting as (contested) promissories, market narratives contribute to 
"agencing" a market, such that actors are engaged continually in 
juxtaposing and adjusting their representations of it and putting in place 
those sociotechnical agencements that make the markets resemble those 
narratives. Narrating a market becomes a collective and iterative task of 
equipping actors to shape the markets that they desire.  
Key words: market agencement, performativity, promissory, market 
representations, narrative, Sector Inquiry, pharmaceutical industry, market 
studies  
 
Introduction 
“It is very important that pharmaceutical markets function properly. 
Europe's citizens, including all of us here today, need access to safe, 
innovative and affordable medicines.” Neelie Kroes, European 
Commissioner for Competition Policy, at the presentation of the 
preliminary findings of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry in Brussels, 28 
November 2008  
Previous research in market studies has demonstrated that markets are 
not stable back-cloths of market actors’ activities, but that markets and market 
activities stand in a reciprocal relationship: Markets allow, encourage, or hinder 
market actors’ activities at the same time as these activities shape the markets in 
which they take place (e.g. Slater 2002; Callon and Muniesa 2005; Kjellberg and 
Helgesson 2006; Çalişkan and Callon 2010). Market studies research has also 
pointed to a reciprocal relationship between market representations and market 
activities (Kjellberg and Helgesson 2006), but has arguably failed to explore this 
link in greater detail. In this paper, we investigate the role of the regulator, via the 
mechanism of a European Sector Inquiry, in shaping or, more specifically, 
innovating a market, defined here as "disrupting how actors carry out their market 
activities." We ask the question: What role do market representations, such as 
the competing narratives emerging from these Inquiries, play in innovating and 
shaping a market’s sociotechnical agencements? 
We seek answers to this question by tracing how, through the means of 
public narratives, market actors attempt to defend, draw attention to, distract 
from, condemn, or implicate others in certain market practices. The purpose of 
such narratives, of course, is to represent market practices and the market to 
which they relate in a manner most advantageous to the narrating actor. But, as 
Kjellberg and Helgesson (2006) have highlighted, representing market practices 
is first and foremost a means of shaping these practices, and this emerges 
clearly in narratives.  
A critical feature of narratives is that they are "promissory" in that they 
mobilize future states, invoking these descriptions in current disputes to support 
some practices and discredit others.  Narratives also depict past happenings as 
events, interpreting these as being either favorable or unfavorable to how a 
market is shaped at present. We assert that narratives, supporting narratives, 
and counter-narratives about market practices act twofold: One, by claiming 
stakes in a market with a view to justifying and solidifying existing practices or 
proposing new ones; two, by bringing into being the market as narrated through 
creating what Butler (2010, 147) calls "socially binding consequences". In turn, 
these consequences shape the market’s sociotechnical agencements, which we 
define, with Cochoy (2014), as textual and material assemblage with the power 
of agency. In keeping with this idea, we define market narratives as emplotted 
market representations that participate in mobilizing a market’s future socio-
technical agencements. Moving conceptual discussions in market studies beyond 
market representations, our paper sees market narratives as promissories that 
invoke and enable future markets and thus as powerful tools in innovating 
markets, or indeed, in defending markets and their practices against others’ 
innovative plans.   
As our opening vignette indicates, the market in question is the 
pharmaceutical market. At the risk of simplifying what are highly complex issues, 
this market is caught between two broad discourses in the economics of 
innovation (eg, Nelson and Winter, 1982): The first discourse revolves around 
enhancing welfare through firms’ research and development (R&D) activities and 
novel medicines being made available through market entry, imitation and price 
competition, so becoming affordable. The second discourse is one of firms’ R&D 
activities being subject to the incentives of expected monopolistic rents, 
supported by patents that protect intellectual property from imitation for a period 
of time. Davis and Abraham (2013) explain that pharmaceutical regulation is 
aimed primarily at reconciling these two discourses by balancing the 
pharmaceutical producers’ commercial and monopolistic interests with the 
welfare and health interests of consumers and society. Simply put, the regulator 
has to ask "if I give a pharmaceutical firm monopolistic protection through a drug 
patent now, how certain is it that the firm will reinvest these monopolistic rents 
into more socially beneficial R&D activities? And how can competition be 
encouraged to help make this drug affordable and accessible in the long run?" In 
doing so, regulation has to anticipate the future effects of current socio-technical 
agencements.  
Davis and Abraham see pharmaceutical innovation as the quintessential 
"promissory science", “mak[ing] promissory claims about the social/health value 
of the new technology/drug, which create powerful expectations about (and 
hence demands for) that technology within wider society, including patients” 
(ibid., p. 14). Finch and Geiger (2011) investigate the material bases of market 
innovations in the pharmaceutical industry, demonstrating the pressures in this 
particular industry to continually destabilize its own markets. Thus, fundamentally, 
the industry’s economic, technological, and societal raisons d’être point toward 
the future; a future beset by uncertainties, but nonetheless a future that market 
actors have to anticipate and agree on in the present in order to make it happen.  
As promissories, the two discourses on pharmaceutical innovation come to 
the fore in the narratives that market actors deploy. They emerge over the 
questions of, for instance, "how much regulation," "how much patent protection," 
and "what is “good” innovation." As we examine in this paper, the ways in which 
actors work out answers to these questions shape the socio-technical 
agencements put in place in the pharmaceutical market.  
Our study is based on the document trail from the European Commission’s 
recent attempts to introduce innovation among the market practices of originator 
pharmaceutical companies – those companies which are R&D intensive – in 
relation to the "lifecycle management" of their drugs. The EU Commission did so 
by way of a Sector Inquiry into suspected anti-competitive practices in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The aim of the Sector Inquiry was to ascertain whether 
there existed any evidence of systematic practices of delaying market entry of 
generic pharmaceuticals through agreements between competitors. The 
European Commission suspected that if such agreements existed, they would 
deter innovation in the pharmaceutical industry and cause substantial costs to tax 
payers by extending the breadth and duration of the patent protection awarded to 
producers.   
In the remainder of this paper, we will investigate, through the examples of 
the controversy emanating from this Inquiry’s texts, what role market narratives 
play in agencing markets. Our conceptual approach draws from theories of 
performativity and markets as sociotechnical agencements, as developed by 
Callon and others, as well as from the sociology of expectations (Brown and 
Michael 2003). We use this conceptual background to analyze the body of 
documents available regarding the Sector Inquiry in order to assess how 
narratives shape a market and its practices. We analyze narratives that support 
and that contradict the EU’s suspicion that producers had developed practices in 
the pharmaceutical market to exploit patent law by utilizing a "patent 
management toolkit." We compare and contrast the narratives of the Preliminary 
Report (November 2008) and those emerging from the submissions to the 
subsequent Consultation Period of two months with the narrative emerging from 
the Final Report six months later. The former two are broadly representative of 
the rival discourses on welfare in the industry, of welfare derived by means of 
entry and price competition in market, and of welfare derived from producers 
investing in research and development, reflecting the incentives for securing 
rents under patent.  We conclude the paper by considering the role of market 
narratives as promissories. 
 
Narratives and their worlds  
Narratives play a central role in our understanding of how humans apprehend 
and attempt to shape the socio-material world. Scholars working in fields as 
diverse as sociology, anthropology, management, literary studies, and economic 
history have highlighted the role of discourse, narration, and story-telling in 
creating what we know as "the economic" (e.g. Beckert 2013; Khaire and 
Wadhwani 2010; Maurer 2006; Czarniawska 1998; 2004; McCloskey 1998). This 
body of research indicates that in economic and organizational life, narratives are 
ubiquitous. Narratives and texts are also translocational: they have the capacity 
to travel, be it in written or oral form. Moreover, narratives and texts are networks 
of their own, referring to others through what literary theorists call intertextuality 
(e.g. Keenoy and Oswick 2004).  
While often used interchangeably, there is a certain hierarchical 
relationship among texts, narratives, and discourses. For the present purpose, 
we take texts to be carefully constructed material representations that can, either 
individually or with reference to other texts, build narratives and represent 
relatively coherent choices of who, where, when, what, why, and how. These 
choices often have consequences far beyond the texts themselves. Cooren 
(2004), for instance, examines what mundane texts in organizations "do," and 
concludes that "texts are not foundational; however, they participate, like other 
agents, in the daily production of organizational life" (p. 374). Narratives provide 
a temporal sequence and unfold in a plot; they are connected to modes of 
knowing and communicating and to positioning actors and actions in social life 
generally (Czarniawska 2004). Texts and narratives in turn contribute to 
discourses, or ways of understanding and explaining the world, including "ruling 
in" and "ruling out" certain ways of talking about a topic or object and of 
conducting oneself in relation to the topic or object (Grant and Hardy 2003). 
Discourse is often associated with institutionalization (Philips, Lawrence and 
Hardy 2004) and coalition building (Jones and McBeth 2010). Narratives, 
discourses, texts, and their inter-textual connections thus participate in the 
shaping of social practices, institutions and activities (Potter 1996; Czarniawska 
2004).  
 
Narratives and Performativity 
Pursuing narratives further, we can assess their performative role in 
enacting markets. Callon (1998) draws upon performativity in arguing that 
scientific theories and models are implicated in making and shaping markets out 
of "possible worlds" (Callon 2010). Callon (2002) reflects that performativity first 
referred to language, or more precisely to Austin’s (1962) treatise on "How to Do 
Things with Words", before entering the vocabulary of Actor-Network Theory. 
This reminds us that market discourses or narratives are rarely constative, or 
descriptive of a reality ‘out there’. Instead, they work in and on the market 
realities that they describe: “The discourse of economics contributes to 
establishing the reality that it analyses and explains” (Callon 2010, p. 168).  
Drawing on the Austinian tradition of performativity, Butler (2010) 
emphasizes the role of perlocutionary performativity in economic life, where 
discourses draw their power from being spread and repeated – what she refers 
to as iteration and citation. However, this necessity for repetition also introduces 
space for reflexivity and change (Butler 1999). For Butler, “performativity never 
fully achieves its effect, and so in this sense ‘fails’ all the time; its failure is what 
necessitates its reiterative temporality, and we cannot think iterability without 
failure” (2010. p. 153, original emphasis).  Thus, and of direct relevance to this 
paper, statements gain power through iteration, but iteration also makes them 
‘brokering failure’ , which in turn creates space for political debate. As Callon 
(2010) highlights, Butler’s observation points to the plurality of theoretical 
frameworks accounting for aspects of market functioning and to the fact that any 
performation produces overflows, or, in Austin’s words, "misfires". These misfires 
give rise to what Callon (2007, 2010) calls "performation struggles," where the 
constitution of markets is “constantly tested, criticised, debated, reconstructed 
and consequently subjected to endless redefinitions and reconfigurations” 
(Callon 2010, p. 165) when narrated. Thus both Callon and Butler question 
strongly whether there can ever be a definitive "master narrative". 
Following research into performativity, we can expect market 
representations and narratives to be deployed as part of the normal contests 
over shaping economic practices, and we find some evidence of this in the 
research of the fields of market studies and organization studies. Broadly, extant 
research addressing this issue falls into two categories: studies proximate to the 
sociology of expectations stream, examining how actors use stories to create a 
market; and those that examine how market representations are used to justify 
past market behaviors or actions. The temporality that is so crucial in market 
narratives’ performative power emerges predominantly in the first category of 
studies, where markets’ future effects are debated.  
Beckert, (2013) for instance, has highlighted how stories told in the 
present about the future are creative in paving the way for this future to become 
possible. For Beckert, (2013, p. 222) economic actors often cope with uncertainty 
through fictionality, or "present imaginaries of future situations that provide 
orientation in decision-making despite the uncertainty inherent in the situation." 
Fictions can be made to become self-fulfilling prophecies, but this requires 
considerable concerted investments in the specified futures.  Miller and O’Leary 
(2007) show this in the example of Moore’s Law in the semi-conductors industry, 
in concert with the planning technique of technology road mapping. Doganova 
and Equiem-Reynault (2009) see business plans as an important tool in narrating 
a bright future for a start-up enterprise, to be achieved by securing investment. 
Likewise, Simakova and Neyland (2008) observe the creation and narration of 
"tellable stories" – "a story which narrates boundaries, relations, agency and 
identities for entities" (ibid., p. 96) - about a new product in order to develop both 
a material and imagined world into which that product can be launched. The 
stories refer to some point of ending, of settling, or of actors being able to halt 
and also step away from the narrative as an envisaged setting in the future.  But 
this end point is another instance of contest. Pollock and Williams (2010, p. 528) 
observe a “competition between expectations” in organizing the promissory 
among industry analysts, where the most successful account is the one that 
succeeds in helping to convincingly narrate and then create that “new world” (p. 
542). 
Market representations can help enact futures, but when directed towards 
solidifying practices they can also be used to contest change, innovation, or 
disruption. Future- and past-directed narratives thus often work in tandem. 
Working from an institutional perspective, Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) 
observed the discursive struggle between proponents and opponents of a new 
organizational form (multidisciplinary partnerships between law and accounting 
firms). In their case, market representations are used to defend the institutional 
status quo and thus thwart a particular new future. Simultaneously, the 
justificationary and legitimizing roles of representations emerge often in locations 
where collective sensemaking of past or present market practices acts as 
signposts for future collective action.  Examples include accounts of tribunals or 
inquests (e.g. Brown 2004) and media controversies (e.g. Patriotta, Gond and 
Schultz 2011). Kjellberg (2010), for instance, recounts the struggles over a ten-
year period in market representations of airline markets, both for those with or 
without frequent flyer points, between the Swedish airline SAS and the Swedish 
Competition Authority. He sees these representational struggles as part of a 
normalizing process that not only works by justifying extant practices, but that 
also shapes future exchange practices. Patriotta et al. (2011) take up Boltanski 
and Thévenot’s (2006) notion of orders of worth in their analysis of media 
discourses in the wake of a nuclear accident and trace the discursive resources 
actors mobilized during that time. Boltanski and Thévenot’s framework of orders 
of worth is closely related to the interest of the current paper, as they see these 
orders unfolding in the public domain predominantly through discourse.  Orders 
of worth in this sense are publicly available "political grammars" (ibid.), often with 
material consequences.  
To summarize, extant literature across the sociology of expectations, 
market studies, and institutional theory has regarded stories, rhetorics, 
representations, and fictions as playing an important role in shaping markets. 
Extending these arguments, and combining them with Butler’s focus on iteration 
and citation in performativity, we anticipate that narratives as deployed in markets 
take part in "performation struggles" (Callon 2007) in two ways: First, through 
organizing the passage from one state of affairs to another, they build temporality 
and causality into the realities they describe, which Czarniawska (2004) calls 
"emplotment." Second, by weaving a material network of intertextuality, 
narratives allow for coalition building and claiming stakes, mediating between 
individual and collective market action, between the economic and the political, 
and ultimately between futures enacted and futures unfulfilled. It is this aspect of 
market narratives that we describe in more detail next. 
 
Power, performation struggles and market narratives 
Market representations come into being when actors parse, make and 
offer sense of, or otherwise frame the ‘soup’ of economic practices – Callon 
(2009, p. 20) has referred to this as "explicitation." However, as we have been 
arguing above, market representations are much more than sensemaking 
devices. In order to become "successful" (that is, representational), a statement 
requires investments in the market’s materialities: “To make a formula or auction 
system work, one has to have tools, equipment, metrological systems, 
procedures, and so on.” (Callon 2007, p. 333). In turn, the formula or auction 
system rests on a certain way of thinking about the economic and, crucially, of 
mobilizing its effects, for instance in the context of "fair and efficient markets" 
(Muniesa 2003). By extension, struggles over how to narrate a market do not 
only happen discursively; the possible worlds that the different narratives evoke 
will be subjected to "trials of strength" that are often material in nature. As part of 
a socio-technical agencement, a narrative can literally and materially succeed or 
fail. Thus, narratives go far beyond a representational idiom. Narrating a market 
goes hand in hand with efforts to equip that market to correspond to the narrated 
world.  
If narrative practices are involved in performation struggles, they 
necessarily position their authors in relation to power and authority. Brown (2004) 
notes, with reference to Michel Foucault’s body of work, that master, or what he 
calls authoritative, narratives can be used to silence alternatives. However, 
authoritative narratives are not likely to emerge ready-made.  More likely there 
will be a certain amount of public jostling and recruitment among rival narratives. 
Discursively, the emphasis in the struggle is enrolment among texts, seen as a 
particular pattern of intertextuality. A contemporary example of narratives jostling 
for authority can be seen in the network of tweets and retweets that often 
emerges around public controversies (e.g. Poell and Bora 2012). This is not to 
deny epistemic challenges, which can undermine the authority of a particular text 
or cluster of texts, but we expect these too to be mediated intertextually.  
More broadly, the struggle is between entire sociotechnical agencements, 
where narrating a market means qualifying its objects and actors’ behaviours, 
thus enabling collective (future) action – or what Pollock and Williams (2010, p. 
543) call "world-building activity." Maguire’s (2004) study of the substitution of 
DDT shows such a co-construction of discourse and object through discursive 
struggles and actor enrolment over time in four related areas: artifact-making, 
fact-making, opinion-making and rule-making. In relation to the latter, it is worth 
noting that the role of the law and of national or international regulators in crafting 
authoritative narratives about and enrolling actors to perform in these markets is 
a particularly interesting though neglected subject of market studies 
(Christophers 2013).  
In summary, the point of departure of our current study is in exploring the 
struggles involved in producing an authoritative narrative of a market and that 
struggle’s consequences on the market’s sociotechnical agencements. To do so, 
we trace the assemblage of an authoritative narrative from its initial drafts 
through the various supporting or counter-narratives produced for it to its mature 
form and finally to its performative effects. As illustrated in Figure 1, we focus on 
temporality and recruitment in relation to the narratives presented.  We assess 
how these narratives describe and contest past and present market practices, 
and project and thereby enroll actors into future market practices. The future 
becomes a vital reference point, referring to ideas of how that future can be a 
settled one with knowable characteristics, allowing others to tie those 
descriptions of futures to present understandings of past activities.   
(INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Examining market narratives 
The analyzed body of talk and texts emanates from the EU Pharmaceutical 
Industry Sector Inquiry, which was launched by the Directorate General 
Competition (DG Comp) on 16 January 2008 (the chronology of events is 
graphically presented in Figure 2 below). Unusually, the Sector Inquiry 
commenced with unannounced inspections: 
‘A series of unannounced inspections started immediately after the 
Commission decision, at 3pm, at the premises of a number of both 
innovative and generic pharmaceutical companies operating in 
Europe. The raids were co-ordinated with the competition authorities of 
those member states where the inspections took place’. 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/competition/big-pharma-groups-raided-eu-
antitrust-probe/article-169598, January 16 20081  
On 28 November that same year, after some ten months of investigations, DG 
Comp published a Preliminary Report and thus opened up the Inquiry to a 
statutory two-month period of Public Consultation, during which interested parties 
and members of the general public had an opportunity to respond to the 
Preliminary Report. By the time this Public Consultation period closed on 31 
January 2009, 74 contributions had been received by five broadly distinguishable 
groups of organisations or individuals (as laid out in Table 1 below). The Final 
Report was published by DG Comp on 8 July 2009. The Preliminary and the 
Final Reports, all comments to the Preliminary Report, DG Comp press releases, 
fact sheets, the speeches during the launch of the Preliminary Report as well as 
a number of follow-up monitoring reports are publicly available at   
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html (last 
accessed on 23 January  2015). These 96 texts, ranging in size from a few 
pages to over 500, formed the main body of analyzed documents for this study. 
We also analyzed a range of newspaper clips, internet texts, ancillary policy 
documents, and others as secondary data sources. 
(INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
(INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
Fairclough (1995) argues that discourse should be analysed at three 
levels: the textual, the discursive (what people do with texts), and the social (how 
they represent and are used in cultural and institutional contexts). While being 
mindful of the first and second levels, our analysis below focuses on the third 
level, that of social practices, with a particular view to the texts’ material 
consequences. We leaned heavily on Potter (1996)’s exploration of how texts 
appear to produce facts and how these factual descriptions produce action, and 
on Czarniawska’s (2004) "narrating as organizing." Thus, we probed the question 
of how the texts became involved in, represented and shaped the market in 
question; that is, how they became part of the market’s sociotechnical 
agencements. 2 
We closely read the body of texts several times before sketching emergent 
individual narratives and examined how the market in question is portrayed in 
each, following Czarniawska’s (2004) notion of "inspired reading." We viewed 
individual submissions as practical accomplishments as they include "choices… 
of where to start and where to finish, what to include and what to leave out, what 
to put next to what, and so on" (Potter 1996, 172), and we first plotted and then 
compared these choices across submissions. Leaning on Potter’s (1996) insights 
into fact-making in texts, we paid particular attention to the invoking of market 
actors, the attributions made of market practices to particular actors, stake 
management, and what Potter calls category entitlement, or how a text builds the 
credibility of its producer. Rather than assessing the veracity of the statements 
made in the various texts, we looked for evidence of how the texts were 
constructed to become "successful", both in fact-making and in using this fact-
making to change or stabilize the pharmaceutical market’s sociotechnical 
agencements.  
Related to this point, we took account of Potter’s distinction between texts’ 
epistemological orientation (those elements in a text that work to establish things 
as factual) and their action orientation (elements that are oriented to some action 
or range of actions, with an appreciation that action can produce further facts). 
We also noted what Potter calls "offensive" and "defensive" orientations of 
discourses, where the former is concerned with undermining alternative 
descriptions and the latter with resisting such discounting. Finally, we traced 
intertextuality. As formal responses, all submissions referred directly to the 
Preliminary Report by the EU’s Directorate General for Competition, but they also 
spun a much wider "textscape" (Keenoy and Oswick 2004) across regulatory, 
legal, and scientific realms. This intertextuality, in particular, allowed us to draw 
connections between the narratives that individual texts emplotted, to use 
Czarniawska’s (2004) phrase, the broader realm of discourse emerging from the 
web of texts examined, and the market’s agencements. 
 
Analysis 
Sector Inquiries are investigations that the European Commission carries out into 
sectors of the economy and into types of agreements across various sectors, 
pursuant of Article 17 of Council Regulation 1/2003. The Commission may decide 
to start a Sector Inquiry when a market does not seem to be performing as well 
as it should from an antitrust and competition perspective. As a regulatory 
means, they are of great interest to market studies researchers because rather 
than identifying wrongdoings of individual companies, their focus is on analyzing 
and questioning established market practices common across a number of 
market actors. Hence, the EU establishes a text in order to both guide the use of 
a Sector Inquiry as a formal device, and to bestow a particular, though as we 
shall see below, qualified form of authority to the Inquiry process and reports. 
The EU Sector Inquiry into anti-competitive practices in the pharmaceutical 
industry was not the first of its kind; it followed previous Inquiries in the energy, 
financial services, and telecommunications industries. The aim of the 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry was to ascertain whether any evidence of a 
systematic practice of delaying market entry of generic pharmaceuticals through 
agreements between competitors could be found. The European Commission 
suspected that if such agreements existed, they would not only act as a deterrent 
for innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, but they could also cause 
substantial additional costs to tax payers by prolonging the period of protection 
awarded to pharmaceutical companies through patents for medical innovation.3   
 
The Narrative of the Preliminary Report 
The Directorate General for Competition (DG Comp) published its Preliminary 
Report (PR) into anticompetitive practices in the pharmaceutical industry in 
Europe in November 20084. The Report’s foundational justification lay in an 
observed decline in innovation in the pharmaceutical industry in Europe, as 
measured by the decline of new chemical entities reaching the market over the 
past decade. While acknowledging the rights of firms to intellectual property, its 
main allegation was that companies that created new medicines applied 
defensive patenting strategies "primarily aimed at blocking competitors in the 
development of new medicines," which resulted in a decline in innovation "as 
evidenced by the decline of new chemical entities reaching the market" (PR pp. 
330-332). From the outset, the inquiry was couched in the rival discourses of 
market competition and of intellectual property rights and innovation as ways of 
enhancing consumer welfare: 
“The Commission's action will therefore complement, not challenge, 
intellectual property law, as both systems share the objectives of fostering 
innovation, and increasing consumer welfare.” (Press release on the launch 
of the Inquiry, IP/08/49) 
The substantial findings of the Preliminary Report pointed to market practices 
where originator companies, which developed and sold new medicines, delayed 
the market entry of cheaper generics and blocked other originator 
companies’ innovations and thus, potentially, the discovery of new drugs through 
a "patent management tool kit:" “Originator companies use a variety of strategies 
to extend the commercial life of their medicines for as long as possible” (PR p. 
9). Originator companies were also found to have concluded agreements through 
litigations, in particular concerning the marketing and commercialization of drugs.   
The report suggested that originator companies used “a variety of methods” 
with the objective of delaying or blocking market entry of generic companies in 
order to ensure continued revenue streams for their medicines. The main 
practices of “life cycle management strategies” (PR) identified included: 
• Launching multiple patent applications for the same medicine, with filing 
for up to 1,300 patents EU-wide in relation to a single medicine (so-called 
patent clusters): “Patent clusters can lead to uncertainty for generic 
competitors as to whether and when they can start to develop a generic 
medicine without infringing one of the many (new) patents, even though 
patent holders admit internally that some of these patents might not be 
strong.” (PR p. 10), 
• Increasing patent applications for blockbuster medicines throughout the 
life cycle of a product, and particularly toward the end of the protection 
period conferred by the first patent,  
• Filing “divisional patent” applications. Divisional patent applications are 
instruments allowing the applicant to split an initial (parent) application, 
• Initiating disputes and litigation with generic manufacturers (over 700 
cases observed in relation to the 219 medicines investigated between 
2000 and 2007), 
• Concluding patent settlements which constrain the market entry of generic 
companies, often with accompanying “value transfer”, extending to direct 
payments, from the originator to the generic company, 
• Intervening before national authorities when generic companies ask for 
regulatory approval: “Originator companies claimed in their interventions 
that generic products were less safe, less effective and/or of inferior 
quality.” (PR p. 12), 
• Engaging in extensive sales and marketing campaigns aimed at health 
care professionals, often with a view to putting in question the safety and 
efficacy of potential generic competitors: “… originator companies spent 
on average 23% of their turnover on marketing and promotion activities for 
their products. As part of their commercial strategies, originator companies 
do not simply promote their own medicines to doctors and other 
healthcare professionals. There are also indications of practices seeking 
to put into question the quality of generic medicines.” (PR p. 12), 
• Launching second-generation medicines late in the patent period: 
“Originator companies undertake intensive marketing efforts with the aim 
of switching a substantial number of the patients to the new medicine prior 
to market entry of a generic version of the first generation product. If they 
succeed, the probability that generic companies will be able to gain a 
significant share of the market decreases significantly. … Whilst it is 
generally accepted that innovation is often achieved in incremental steps, 
patents relating to second generation products are sometimes criticised as 
weak by other stakeholders who argue that they show only a marginal (if 
any) improvement or additional benefit to the patients.” (PR p. 13), 
• Influencing the distribution and supply chain channels. 
In many instances, the Preliminary Report finds that originator companies 
engage in several or even all of these practices simultaneously. On average, 
these practices saw generics enter the market about seven months after the 
expiry of a compound’s main patent, though with considerable variations across 
Member States and across medicines. If generic entry had taken place without 
these delays, savings across the EU, according to the Preliminary Report, could 
have been an estimated € 3 billion over the seven year period studied, reducing 
expenditure for these medicines by more than 5%. While acknowledging the 
difficulties and bottlenecks that the EU patent regime and national regulator and 
payer practices present to pharmaceutical companies, the narrative of the inquiry 
strongly suggests that the originator companies’ market practices under 
investigation “contribute to this” (PR p. 6). 5  
Taken in the round, the narrative of the Preliminary Report is one of a group 
of market actors – originator companies – using a host of practices allowing each 
of them to evade competition for their lucrative branded drugs. They are also cast 
as a group of companies that are purportedly more concerned with protecting on-
going revenue streams than with pharmaceutical innovation or any other notion 
of public good. In the Preliminary Report, this is a master narrative, which 
fundamentally is a claim of anticompetitive behavior, its adverse consequences 
for welfare in society, frustrating market entry, and with little trade-off of the 
monopolists undertaking additional socially-beneficial innovation.   
The narrative comprises significant epistemic content, which develops by 
triangulation in great detail over 430 pages, through the use of graphs, statistics, 
case vignettes (often acting as mini-narratives within the narrative), direct quotes 
from originator companies’ internal briefings, emails and strategy documents, as 
well as interview sources in originator and generic companies. The Preliminary 
Report is careful not to single out any individual originator company; even the 
vignettes do not feature identifiers. This is part of the conditions of use 
established by the EU for Sector Inquires. The market practices described are 
those of a group of companies, not of individual firms. Likewise, generic 
companies, described in the Report as often smaller and regional players, were 
broadly cast as victims of these market practices6. The main victims, however, 
are identified as consumers, who are said to be missing out on or having delayed 
access to innovative and affordable drugs, and of course the national payers of 
pharmaceuticals, who have to contend with substantial financial losses 
calculated in terms of delays in generic market entry:  
The combined use of life cycle instruments may increase the likelihood of 
delays to generic entry; delays due to the use of several instruments may 
sometimes be cumulative. More generally, it may significantly increase legal 
uncertainty to the detriment of generic entry and can cost public health 
budgets and ultimately consumers significant amounts of money. (PR, p. 
13) 
 
Counter- and Supporting Narratives 
In keeping with Commission protocol, a consultation period of two months 
followed the Preliminary Report, during which over 70 interested parties - 
including consumer associations, national regulators, originator companies, 
generic companies, insurance associations, and others - voiced their 
perspectives on the issues raised (see Table 1). All of the submissions claimed to 
be based on the same epistemic premises as the Preliminary Report: that 
innovation is vital for European Citizens' welfare and can only be achieved 
through constant innovative activity protected by strong patent law. Yet, in some 
of these contributions, very different narratives of pharmaceutical market 
practices in general, and of the question of whose activities are blocking 
innovation in the pharmaceutical market, emerged. What is more, potential 
consequences of interfering with existing practices are also conjured up in many 
of these counter-narratives. As an example, one major European pharmaceutical 
company asserted:  
“The Preliminary Report does not in our view address the issues of real 
concern within the pharmaceutical sector. ... Any empirical study of the 
pharmaceutical sector should take into consideration market distortion 
caused by national regulatory regimes, which dictate competitive conditions 
on both the supply and demand side. The research and development of 
new drugs is getting more difficult and costly, with increasing regulatory 
hurdles such as larger and more complex trials. We are particularly 
concerned that the Commission, in its preliminary report, has singled out 
the filing, prosecution and enforcements of patents as a focus for criticism. 
Any action by the Commission that weakens the patent system or causes 
uncertainty in the industry as to the feasibility of patenting inventions will 
have a chilling effect on research and innovation within the European Union 
to the ultimate detriment of patients.”  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_pharma/bayer.pdf  
(our emphases) 
Here, the very players that stand accused of activities that worked against 
innovation turn the table on the Commission. They state that it is the regulators 
who are working as market actors against patient interests by making 
pharmaceutical innovation difficult and costly, rather than anything that could be 
construed as "reprehensible practice" (ibd.) on the originator companies’ part. In 
this narrative it is the Commission that perpetuates the very status quo that 
seems unsatisfactory to consumers, regulator and drug companies alike. 
Originator companies, on the other hand, are portrayed as stalwarts of fostering 
innovation: "Without the research and the funding of the development of new 
medicines by the top-20 pharmaceutical companies, not many medicines would 
see the light of day" (Johnson & Johnson). 
Many of the originator companies’ submissions also draw attention to 
generics companies as perpetrators rather than passive victims. To quote an 
industry representative at the Preliminary Report’s Presentation, "The 
Commission has not addressed the main problem [of cost to the tax payer]", 
which is, in the eyes of the originator companies, the problem posed by generics 
companies. Submissions state, for instance, that these companies launch 
generic medicines "at risk," that is before the end of a medicine’s patent period, 
or engage in price collusion to keep prices artificially high post-entry.7 Rather 
than accepting the position of villain in the Preliminary Report’s narrative, the 
originator companies point to their own share of injustice suffered: "although the 
Preliminary Report is clearly influenced by generic claims as to the alleged 
potential harm that may be suffered if an interim injunction is granted, it makes 
nothing but passing reference to the harm that is suffered by an innovator if no 
injunction is granted." 
At the same time as they attribute wrongdoings to players and practices 
elsewhere in the market, the originator companies attempt to discredit the 
narrative emerging from the Preliminary Report on substantial and 
methodological - that is, epistemological - grounds:  
"Whatever the precise words used in the report were, the media took away 
the impression that company behaviour was a very significant – indeed 
perhaps the sole - cause of the extra cost to payers …This is wholly 
misleading as at no point does the Preliminary Report identify what, if any, 
delay in generic entry was in fact caused by innovator company behaviour. 
Indeed, it contains no evidence, as opposed to conjecture, that company 
behaviours caused delay, far less that they did so wrongfully." (our 
emphases)  
 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_pharma/gsk.pdf 
In parallel with questioning the legitimacy of the Preliminary Report’s 
narrative on epistemological grounds, the counter-narratives also redefine and 
reframe a number of the defamed market practices, thus attacking the report on 
action grounds. For instance, where the Commission interprets certain practices 
as anticompetitive and potentially libellous, originator companies see them as 
"sound commercial practice" (EFPIA submission) and assert that "no conclusions 
whatsoever can be drawn from any theory of harm"’
 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_pharma/gsk.pdf 
Overall, three issues are noteworthy across the originator companies’ 
submissions: One, individual submissions, though varying in tone and length, are 
very much in unison in their criticism against the Preliminary Report and in their 
projections of what any disturbance of existing practices would mean for the 
European health consumer’s future. Indeed, the phrasing encountered in the 
quote above, of changes potentially having a "chilling effect on pharmaceutical 
R&D in Europe," is repeated across several submissions. All individual 
submissions also either directly flag their support or take their cue from the 
lengthy response of their industry association, the EFPIA (European Federation 
of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations), to the Preliminary Report, thus 
ensuring that the industry’s narrative is a concerted one, with the potential of 
becoming authoritative in itself. The responses knit a heavy intertextual web 
weighing down on any purported attempt to disrupt these practices. Note that the 
two discourses invoked in the narratives are the same as those invoked in the 
EU’s report: those of fostering innovation and increasing consumer welfare.  
Two, the originators’ counter-narrative is supported by lawyers, law 
associations, and patent attorneys, whose submissions mostly point to the fact 
that none of the alleged practices the Preliminary Report accused the originator 
companies of are illegal. The involvement of law and legal professionals adds in 
a further master-narrative and intertextuality, describing what counts as a fair 
legal process and outcome.   
Three, though originator companies assert that they share the DG Comp’s 
overarching objective of safeguarding consumer welfare and industry 
innovativeness, attributions differ diametrically from those of the Preliminary 
Report. They do so mainly by ascribing the final decision power to parties who, in 
the Preliminary Report, were mainly cast as passive victims, namely the patients 
and their doctors who in the last instance will decide over issues of 
innovativeness or otherwise of the products used. The narrative concludes quite 
simply that until such time as the system appears broken in these market actors’ 
eyes, "changes to improve the functioning of the pharmaceuticals market need to 
avoid unbalancing the framework constructed and refined over many years."  
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_pharma/pfizer.pdf). 
 
What of the other narratives, those of consumer associations, the 
European Patent Office, and the generics companies and their associations? 
Unsurprisingly, the generic companies strongly welcomed the Sector Inquiry and 
the Preliminary Report’s findings and urgently called for the Commission to follow 
up on these findings with legal and regulatory actions. They also called upon a 
number of additional cast members’ behaviors to come under DG Comp’s 
scrutiny, chiefly amongst them the large national payers, who often agree to long-
term contracts with originator companies that seem impenetrable to competitors. 
Consumer associations, though their submissions were notably small in number, 
also voiced their support for DG Comp’s perspective of the market, and equally 
called on the Commission to follow words with action, both with regard to its own 
failings (particularly what some identify as a ‘soft’ approach to granting patent 
rights) as to those of originator companies. Finally, national health buyers, payers 
and reimbursers of medicines, who often act on behalf of patients, used their 
voice to counter the many points of criticism they incurred in the originator 
companies’ narratives. Instead of therapeutic reference pricing, health technology 
assessments, or payback mechanisms causing delays, national payers portrayed 
these as sound scientific and management practices.  
Despite their various disagreements, all those contributing to the 
Consultation were unanimous on one point: that a unitary European patent 
system would accelerate the time it takes for pharmaceutical companies to gain a 
patent, decrease the associated administrative and financial burdens, and bring 
greater unity into a fragmented and overly complex system. The unitary patent 
thus acted as a unifying end point or utopian object in which all narratives 
overlapped. 
 
Reconciling the narratives 
Six months later, one commentator remarked that "DG Competition’s release of 
its long-awaited Final Report on its Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry on 8 July 2009 
was somewhat of a damp squib compared to the fireworks surrounding the 
publication of its Interim [Preliminary] Report some eight months earlier." (Hull 
2009, p. 14). The Final Report’s key narrative veered away somewhat from the 
Preliminary Report’s original focus on pharmaceutical companies’ business 
practices and replaced that emphasis with one on regulatory shortcomings and 
the need for patent reform, as well as the development of a single patent court 
system. To summarize, it stated that: 
• A Community patent and a unified specialised patent litigation system in 
Europe would reduce administrative burdens and uncertainty for 
companies.  
• Recent initiatives of the European Patent Office (EPO) to ensure a high 
quality standard of patents granted and to accelerate procedures were 
welcomed. This included measures taken in March 2009 to limit the 
possibilities and time periods during which voluntary divisional patent 
applications could be filed (a so-called "raising the bar" exercise).  
While attributing future action imperatives mainly to its own institutions, the 
Commission also urged member states to streamline pricing and reimbursement 
policies and to significantly accelerate approval procedures for generic 
medicines.   
In many stakeholders’ (especially the originators’) view, the 2009 Final 
Report was more "balanced" than the Preliminary Report; toning down the 
"emotive rhetoric" (Hull 2009) some had perceived, and found offence at, in the 
Preliminary Report. For instance, the uses of the terms "defensive," "secondary," 
or "weak" patent, which in the Preliminary Report were used to highlight and 
deconstruct the market practices associated with these market objects, were in 
the Final Report aligned with the dispassionate language of European patent law, 
which only knows of "patents" as awarded on the basis of technical novelty rather 
than patient value. Unsurprisingly, the Commission’s shift in tone was welcomed 
by EFPIA, the trade group representing large pharmaceutical companies. In a 
statement, the group found that its counter-narrative’s objective of refocusing the 
discussion from potential industry wrongdoings towards streamlining the EU 
patent system was adequately reflected in the Final Report. EFPIA also noted 
that the Final Report "failed to substantiate" earlier allegations that patenting 
strategies of some pharma companies dampened innovation.  
 
Narratives and performances 
So through the Final Report, were narratives reconciled and the status 
quo ante bellum re-established? Not quite. As mentioned, we can expect an 
authoritative narrative to include an elaboration of some end point, be it legal or 
economic, to which a majority of actors can subscribe. An impetus towards 
reconciling opens up the questions of maintaining what has become an 
expanded and complex intertextuality, and of actors enacting this now-reconciled 
future. In launching the Final Report in July 2009, Commissioner Nelly Kroes 
asserted that the Report reiterated that company practices were a significant 
factor behind "competition problems" in the pharma sector, revealing that the 
trajectory that had led to the Final Report and to the more critical narrative of the 
Preliminary Report had not necessarily vanished8. This message was also to be 
translated into action. On the day of the Final Report’s launch, Commissioner 
Kroes announced a fresh antitrust investigation against a French pharmaceutical 
firm for suspected breaches of rules on restrictive businesses practices and on 
the abuse of a dominant market position, and a two to three year monitoring 
exercise to probe further into on-going patent settlements between originator and 
generics companies. She also announced further legal cases arising from the 
material collected by the Sector Inquiry. Thus, while the final narrative proved to 
be consensual in its broad coalition building, the ensuing regulatory actions 
agenced parts of the Preliminary as well as the Final Reports.  
 The Sector Inquiry’s Final Report and the yearly monitoring reports 
commissioned and published subsequent to the Inquiry (2010–2013) showed 
that narratively emplotting certain market practices can indeed change the 
market’s agencements. Patent settlements considered potentially problematic 
from the perspective of competition law9 fell from representing 22% of all 
originator-generic patent settlements in the period from 2000 to 2007 to 10% in 
2009 and as low as 3% in 2010, having, according to the last of the monitoring 
reports, "stabilized at a low level" of around 7% in 2012. By July 2012, three 
years after the publication of the Final Report, the Commission had taken out or 
announced proceedings against at least five sets of companies for possible 
violations of EU competition rules, including practices involving generic 
companies. Finally, the Commission itself took a significant step forward in the 
reordering of the market, a step that had been decades in the making: “In 2012 
Member States and the European Parliament agreed on the ‘patent package’ – 
a legislative initiative consisting of two Regulations and an international 
Agreement, laying grounds for the creation of unitary patent protection in the 
EU.” (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/patent/).  
While the unitary patent and the European Patent Court are yet to be 
ratified by most member states, at least on paper the unifying future state 
envisaged in the shared master narrative of the Final Report has been reached 
with the institutionalization of this narrative end point on 1 January 2014. Though 
far from providing closure to the rival innovation discourses in the pharmaceutical 
industry, the Sector Inquiry and its narratives have decisively changed the 
powers (and obligations) to act in this market. 
 
Discussion  
Tracing a market controversy through its public textscape, as we have done in 
the analysis above, gives an insight into to the role narratives play in agencing 
markets. While we could not access the private processes of narrative 
construction (cf. Abolafia 2010) beyond the public texts themselves, we have 
traced how the development of the Inquiry’s initial, counter, and authoritative 
narratives shape the market’s agencements. The pharmaceutical market is a 
prototypical "concerned" market (Geiger, Harrison, Kjellberg and Mallard 2014), 
where regulatory concerns, patient interests, government costs, "big" and "small" 
pharma, global and local agendas coalesce and compete with patent law, 
scientific innovation, and drug lifecycles. Such concerned markets are shaped by 
a multitude of actors, voices, interests and values, and while changing their 
sociotechnical agencements is bound to be fraught with difficulty and challenge, 
they are also spaces where dissenting voices can be made audible.  
As market representations that highlight temporality, market narratives are 
implicated in these markets’ agencements and simultaneously contribute to their 
reordering.  As claimed by Callon (2007, p. 320), there is “nothing left outside the 
agencement”, and a change in narrative will inevitably lead to changes elsewhere 
in this textual and material assemblage. In our case, the process of juxtaposing 
rival narratives and reaching the compromise narrative moved the European 
Union a step closer to bringing the Unitary Patent to reality. It also compelled that 
same actor to follow up on some of the potential misconducts unearthed during 
the Inquiry. Finally, it likely prompted the pharmaceutical industry to ensure that 
its future actions were consistent with how they had been narrated during the 
Inquiry. Representations, in our case as narratives, have agency, but as Butler 
(2010) claims, they act in a perlocutionary rather than illocutionary sense; that is, 
only if market actors buy into and invest in the "possible worlds" they emplot.  
In some contrast to Beckert (2013), whose concern lies with mental 
representations and collective beliefs rather than with socio-technical 
agencements, we contend that not every "fiction" has the potential to become 
performative. As we showed in our analysis, the contests around "whose 
narrative" would succeed were partly fought out in terms of the (material) 
accountability of their claims and partly in terms of how they enrolled supporting 
actors and their narratives. Pollock and Williams (2010) examine "successful" 
promissory organizations, such as Gartner, in relation to how they mobilize 
promises about new technologies and how they organize the promissory space. 
The narratives we traced in this paper acted in a similar manner: They emplotted 
(widely known) past and existing market practices by mobilizing the sector’s two 
opposing discourses of innovation – societal welfare and innovative rents. They 
then emplotted changes in the market’s agencements into the intertextual 
narrative with a fictional end point where both discourses are more or less in 
balance; an end point that, as a compromise narrative, is preferable to the 
market’s status quo. Narrating market practices in this context opened up the 
possibility of economic reordering and market innovation. 
 It is a relatively small step from this analysis of the performative role of 
narratives to the issue of power, or "which narrative" will be invested in and 
prevail, and associated questions of what role regulation has in providing public 
space for alternative market narratives to be "agenced." These questions lead us 
from the realm of report writing to that of the political, where market stakeholders, 
public actors with interests in civil society discuss rules and contest market 
representations (e.g. Callon 2009; Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe 2009, 
Overdevest 2011). Callon (2009) presents the idea of "democratizing markets," 
where market innovation becomes a collective task, and where the question to 
be resolved is one of equipping market actors to shape the markets that they 
promote. In the context of EU biofuel sustainability schemes, Laurent (2014) 
suggests the term "European agencements" instead of "market agencements" to 
highlight how the political lies within the qualification of economic objects and 
spaces.  
We demonstrated one case where a public inquiry "problematized" (Callon 
1986) an existing sociotechnical agencement and opened up a forum for 
discussion and contestation around different ways of reordering the agencement 
in question. In our case, narratives and counter-narratives were fused into a 
carefully framed hybrid master or authoritative narrative, to which ostensibly all 
interested actors could subscribe. As with any attempt at framing, though, the 
spillovers of those alternative or suppressed narratives are still visible and lurking 
behind the master narrative (cf. Callon 1998; 2002). The controversy may be 
closed down for now, but concerned publics remain, and their rival narratives are 
still circulating and enrolling others.  
As devices, narratives bring their own processes, and temporality is 
critical. A narrative becomes a way of reconstructing the past, as through 
inferences of causality, and of envisaging a future end-point to a process, which 
is often abstract, as in the equilibrium of neoclassical economics, or the 
conditions that allow it to reach an end point, such as of a legal process. But 
these narratives inform and shape the visions and materialities of a market, and 
so provide a basis for sorting out current practices into helpful and unhelpful, fair 
and unfair.  Simply put, once debated in the open, things could just not remain 
unchanged – after all, “discourse produces the effects that it names”, albeit in a 
reiterative manner (Butler 1999, p. 236). Narratives and counter-narratives are 
powerful devices of political and economic action because they offer a temporal 
shape to a market and identify, contest, and provide a critique of the uses of 
some practices and tools. 
 
Conclusion 
Our overarching concern in this paper lies with how markets come to be 
innovated, by exploring in more detail the hitherto under-researched link between 
market representations and market agencements. Moving from market 
representations to market narratives allowed us to trace how, in a market, 
existing practices become emplotted and related to "possible worlds" or futures 
that then become mobilized in socio-technical agencements. The narratives 
described in this study link into broad discourses around the pharmaceuticals 
industry, of innovation, welfare, and public good.  
Fundamentally, these discourses attempt to resolve whether society is 
better off having producers earning monopoly profits so as to facilitate significant 
research and development, or whether it is preferable to subject producers to 
market entry and price competition. Both possibilities are beset by uncertainty: 
Will the companies actually invest in novel research and development projects? 
Will lower cost products produced in more competitive markets be of comparable 
quality to those produced presently? What else needs to be in place so as to 
militate against any unfavorable outcomes?  
As we have shown, narratives are not self-fulfilling prophecies that in and 
of themselves produce realities. Rather, as with Butler (2010), it is precisely by 
emplotting such uncertainties, relating them to existing and future market 
agencements, juxtaposing and opening them up to the possibility of misfires, that 
these narratives become performative. Market narratives become promissories – 
but only if and when they remain open to being wrong. We hope that our study 
will inspire researchers to further develop the complex relationships between 
agencements, expectations, futures, representations, performativity, and 
representations in markets that we have started to trace. 
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1
  It was the first time that a Sector Inquiry opened with such raids, and for many 
commentators they represented an application that was unprecedented in its force and 
signalling value of the EU’s antitrust regulations. To justify this approach, the FAQ 
Section of the DG Comp website reads: “The kind of information the Commission will be 
examining in this inquiry, notably concerning the use of intellectual property rights, 
litigation and settlement agreements covering the EU, is by its nature information that 
companies tend to consider highly confidential. Such information may also be easily 
withheld, concealed or destroyed. The Commission is keen to have immediate access to 
all such company information and has therefore ordered unannounced inspections.” 
 
2
  A disclaimer is necessary at this point. In ‘Representing Reality’, Jonathan Potter 
(1996) points out that any attempt at analysing or deconstructing discourse within a 
conventional textual narrative such as a scientific text - as with the present one - is 
essentially a self-referential exercise. (Social) scientific texts use the same procedures as 
other texts when they “separate descriptions from their own interests and produce them as 
neutral and external; that is, to give them a quality of out-there-ness” (p. 15) are used. As 
                                                                                                                                                 
a narrative in itself, the scientific text is always partial and incomplete. So too, by 
extension, is this article. 
 
3
  It is noteworthy that this Inquiry was from the outset couched in terms of 
safeguarding competition rather than public welfare, though the narratives constructed 
referred to both discourses. 
 
4
  The publication of this report followed a large-scale investigation by DG Comp 
including the analysis of more than 20,000 pages of texts obtained during the January 
2008 inspections, interviews with a range of stakeholders, surveys of pharmaceutical 
companies and other stakeholders and requests for information. 
 
5
  One may note that the Rt. Hon. Sir Robin Jacob, Court of Appeal of England and 
Wales, found none of these market practices to be either remarkable or novel in his 
speech at the Commission Presentation of the PR.  
 
6
  It needs to be mentioned that some originator companies are also manufacturers 
of generic medicines and that many generic firms are large global entities, so this 
separation is not quite as clear-cut as made out here. 
 
7
  The Inquiry Report specifically excludes generic price competition from its 
purview. 
 
8
  This throws up interesting reflections on the reach and longevity of reports, as 
well as on the fact that the intertextuality is both synchronous and diachronous – older 
versions do not necessarily disappear when they are replaced with newer ones, such that 
the making of these texts remains visible. 
 
9
  So-called pay-for-delay transactions or those which limit market entry for generic 
companies and include value transfers from originator to generic company. 
 
